MV Cameo: A Question of Navigation

“The stranding of this modern well-equipped vessel during daylight in fine weather and in well marked and charted waters seems to call for a clearer explanation than we are able, from the evidence available, to provide.”

Those were not the words of a newspaper reporter looking for a dramatic explanation for a shipwreck. They were the conclusion of the Court of Inquiry appointed to investigate the loss of the motor vessel Cameo on Arklow Bank. Its report, published in 1951, reconstructed the ship's final hours through courses, bearings, buoys, tidal set and the evidence of the men who had been navigating her.¹

What emerged was an unusually clear account of an avoidable wreck. There had been no fog, machinery failure or violent weather when Cameo first went aground. The sea was smooth, the wind light and visibility good. The ship had charts, working compasses and navigational marks around her. Nevertheless, at about 08:30 on Sunday 10 September 1950, she ran onto Arklow Bank.¹

Cameo

Cameo was a steel single-screw cargo coaster of 945.51 gross tons, built by A. & J. Inglis Ltd. at Glasgow in 1937. Her machinery was aft and she was equipped with direct-acting electric steering gear controlled from the bridge. Her most recent special survey had been completed in March 1949.¹

She was owned by William Robertson Shipowners Ltd. of Glasgow. On her final voyage she was carrying 1,259 tons of coal from Port Talbot to Dublin. Her draught was recorded as 13 feet 7 inches forward and 16 feet 3 inches aft.¹

Captain George Forbes Esson was in command. The Court recorded twelve people aboard in all, although the working crew numbered eleven. The vessel's lifesaving appliances, lights and sound signals were satisfactory, she carried the appropriate charts and sailing directions, and her two Kelvin magnetic compasses had been adjusted only a few months previously.¹

There was, in other words, nothing obviously deficient about the ship with which to explain what happened next.

06:30

At 06:30 BST on 10 September the second mate fixed Cameo's position at about eight miles south and half a mile west, magnetic, from the Arklow Bank light vessel. The ship was steering north by half west.¹

Fifteen minutes later the second mate altered course to north by half east in order to bring the light vessel ahead. At 07:10 the course was altered again, this time to north-north-west, so that Cameo would pass the light vessel to starboard.¹

Captain Esson came onto the bridge at about 07:30. Ten minutes later the Arklow light vessel was abeam, only a few hundred yards away.

That moment became the central point in the subsequent inquiry. The question was not whether Cameo had known where she was at 07:40. The light vessel itself provided an unmistakable reference. The question was what course she followed after passing it.

The alteration

Captain Esson's evidence was that he maintained the north-north-west course for another thirteen to fifteen minutes after passing the light vessel. At about 07:55, he said, he altered course to north by east.¹

The Court did not accept that account.

Had Cameo genuinely remained on the north-north-west course for that long, the Court concluded that she could only have reached the place where she eventually stranded through what it called a “quite phenomenal” tidal set or a gross deviation in steering. The evidence supported neither explanation.¹

The Court was therefore forced to a different conclusion: the alteration towards Arklow Bank had been made considerably earlier than the master remembered.

The distinction was crucial. A few minutes represented a substantial difference in position. By turning to starboard too soon, Cameo was directed towards the bank rather than safely past it.

The tide

Course alone was not the whole problem. From the time the Arklow light vessel was abeam, the tide was setting approximately 025° true at about two knots. The Court found that insufficient allowance had been made for this north-easterly set.¹

A vessel steering close to a shoal could therefore be carried progressively towards it even while maintaining the intended compass heading. The Court concluded that Captain Esson was seriously at fault both for making the alteration too early and for failing to compensate adequately for the tide.

The buoy

There should also have been further warning that Cameo's position was not developing as intended. Captain Esson stated that at about 07:55 the Glassgorman No. 3 buoy was abeam to port, five or six miles away, and that this observation influenced his decision to alter course.

Again, the Court had difficulty reconciling that evidence with the vessel's eventual track. It concluded that the position claimed for the ship at 07:55 did not fit the bearing of Wicklow Head given at the same time, and expressed particular concern about the master's failure to pay attention to the buoy at the southern end of Arklow Bank.¹

The navigational marks around the ship were not merely objects to be identified. Their changing bearings provided a continuous means of checking whether the vessel was actually following the intended track.

08:00

Just before 08:00 Captain Esson left the bridge. The second mate was still there and no particular orders were given. At 08:00 the chief officer, George Howard Robinson, relieved the second mate and took over the watch.¹

Robinson was told that the captain had just left the bridge after setting the ship on a course of north by east. The sea was smooth, the wind light, the weather fine and visibility good.

The Court acknowledged the position in which this placed the chief officer. An experienced master had only just left the bridge after setting a course. Robinson therefore had every reason to assume that Cameo was safely navigated.

But assumption was not enough.

During the next half-hour Robinson did not check the vessel's position. The Court found that an intelligent lookout at the bearings of Wicklow Head, the navigational buoys and the Arklow light vessel astern would have caused him to verify the ship's position carefully.¹

He did not.

08:30

Half an hour after Robinson took the watch, Cameo ran onto Arklow Bank.¹

The circumstances made the casualty particularly difficult to excuse. It was broad daylight. Visibility was good. The vessel was mechanically sound and properly equipped. The waters were charted and marked. Only fifty minutes earlier she had passed within a few hundred yards of the light vessel marking the bank.

The grounding itself was not immediately fatal to the ship. Every proper step, the Court found, was subsequently taken to try to refloat her. But the weather that had been benign when Cameo stranded was about to change.

Lady Kylsant

At 10:30 that morning news of the grounding reached Wicklow lifeboat station. Fifteen minutes later the Watson-class lifeboat Lady Kylsant launched under Coxswain Edward Kavanagh. The RNLI's contemporary account records calm seas, a light southerly breeze and fine weather.²

The lifeboat reached Cameo at about 12:30. Her master declined assistance. Conditions were still good and he expected the vessel to float free on the next high tide. The lifeboat therefore returned to Wicklow.²

By the following morning the situation was quite different. The light southerly wind had developed into a gale, producing heavy broken water over the bank. Rain had also set in. At the request of the Dublin Port and Docks Board, Lady Kylsant launched again at 08:10 on 11 September to stand by while a tug attempted to refloat the stranded coaster.²

The lifeboat helped pass tow lines between the vessels in heavy seas and rain, but the ropes parted and the attempt failed. Captain Esson still declined to abandon Cameo. After nearly eleven hours at sea the lifeboat returned to Wicklow at 19:20.²

The third launch

Another day passed with Cameo still on the bank. At 20:57 on 12 September a message finally arrived through Seaforth Radio asking for the lifeboat. Lady Kylsant launched for the third time at 21:17.²

It was now a very dark night. The tide was half flood and a strong south-westerly wind was driving a rough sea across the bank. By the time the lifeboat reached Cameo, the wind had increased to a gale and the stranded ship was lying head to the north-east in heavy broken water.²

Kavanagh anchored to windward and allowed the lifeboat to drop back on her cable until she lay abreast of Cameo's port side. Lines were thrown aboard and the lifeboat hauled alongside.

It was just after midnight.

For sixteen minutes Kavanagh held Lady Kylsant alongside the wreck while she rose and fell heavily in the broken water. One by one all eleven members of Cameo's crew jumped down onto the lifeboat. Kavanagh then cast off and brought them safely back to Wicklow at 04:00 on the morning of 13 September.²

The RNLI awarded Coxswain Edward Kavanagh its Bronze Medal for gallantry for his judgment and seamanship. Motor mechanic J. Bonus received the Institution's Thanks inscribed on vellum.²

The inquiry

Ten months later, on 25 and 26 July 1951, a formal investigation into the casualty was held at the Justiciary Buildings in Glasgow before James Wellwood Johnston, Advocate, Sheriff-Substitute of Lanarkshire, assisted by Commander D. V. Sutton RNR and Captain C. A. Hancock DSC.¹

The Court reduced the cause of the casualty to three failures. First, the alteration to starboard after passing the Arklow light vessel had been both too early and too great, with insufficient allowance made for the tidal set. Secondly, inadequate attention had been paid to the navigational buoy marking the tail of Arklow Bank. Thirdly, the chief officer had failed to check the ship's position during his watch or recognise the significance of the changing bearings of Wicklow Head and the other navigational marks.¹

The Court found that the stranding and loss had been caused or contributed to by the wrongful acts or defaults of both Captain Esson and Chief Officer Robinson. Both men were described as seriously at fault and each had his certificate suspended for six months.¹

It is a severe judgment, but the report is interesting precisely because it does not attempt to invent a single dramatic mistake. The loss emerged from a sequence: an alteration made too early, insufficient allowance for the tide, navigational marks that were not properly used to check the ship's progress, and finally a watchkeeper who trusted the course he inherited instead of independently establishing where his vessel was.

The wreck on Arklow Bank

Cameo remained where she had stranded. Modern survey work has subsequently located substantial wreckage on the central part of Arklow Bank. An archaeological assessment for the Arklow Bank Wind Park records that INFOMAR surveyed what it identified as Cameo in 2016, while also noting a discrepancy between the historical charted position and the modern surveyed wreck position.³

The modern remains are substantial. Survey and diving accounts describe much of the bow, middle and stern as exposed and still recognisable, although the upper works have disappeared. The wreck lies in shallow water on the bank, with considerably deeper scour immediately alongside it.³

That survival makes the wreck particularly useful when read alongside the Court report. The bathymetry shows the physical result; the 1951 inquiry preserves the decisions made on the bridge in the fifty minutes before the ship arrived there.

A question of navigation

More than seventy years later, Cameo is an uncomplicated wreck to look at. A ship lies broken and exposed on a sandbank notorious for wrecking vessels. Without the contemporary record, it would be easy to assume bad weather, poor visibility or the uncertainties of navigation before modern electronic positioning.

The Court report removes those explanations one by one. Cameo was well equipped. Her compasses were in order. She carried the necessary charts. Visibility was good. The sea was smooth. The Arklow light vessel had passed only a few hundred yards away.

The weather which ultimately forced the crew to abandon ship came later. Cameo had been put onto Arklow Bank on a fine Sunday morning through something much less dramatic: ordinary navigational errors that were not recognised until there was no water left beneath her.